

Castel de Saint Pierre, &c.

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P R O J E C T

FOR

P E R P E T U A L P E A C E .

By J. J. R O U S S E A U,
Citizen of G E N E V A .

Translated from the F R E N C H ,

With a P R E F A C E by the T R A N S L A T O R .

Tunc genus humanum positis fibi consulat armis,
Inque vicem gens omnis amet.

LUCAN.

L O N D O N :

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
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[Price One Shilling.]





P R E F A C E.

 T has been a long and well-grounded observation, that, tho' no men are treated with more ridicule and contempt than projectors, that none have proved more useful to society, or deserved better from their fellow creatures; that in consequence of this treatment, they are too generally ruined by endeavouring to carry their projects into execution, and that others, advancing on their plan, derive utility to themselves, and expand it on the public. In this instance, however, the author cannot be undone by his proposal, tho' he may lament the disregard thereof, and the world may be more essentially benefited by the observation of his scheme, than by all the efforts hitherto published for encreasing human felicity, as it is the most extensive of all hitherto proposed.

The advantage resulting to nations in general from so extensive a confederacy as that which is planed in the following sheets, cannot be denied: but it is to be apprehended, that too many sovereigns, imagining they are thereby rescinded from the imperious pleasures of

disturbing the tranquility of human kind, of wasting the blood and treasure of their subjects to satisfy sanguinary resentments, and of acquiring glory and dominions by filling the world with terror and desolation, may renounce the calmer means of rendering their subjects happy, by leading them in the paths of virtue, where peace and abundance accompany their footsteps. Whatever may be the inclinations of princes, it is more to be dreaded that ministers will exert every effort to disappoint so universal a plan for the tranquility of Europe : because, by removing the causes of contention, they lose the power of working on the passions of princes, and nothing remaining but the public interest to be pursued, can no longer acquire that powerful ascendancy over them, which is generally obtained by daring to injure their native country, in obedience to the impetuous and destructive inclinations of their masters, and which bears them on into immense riches and distinguished honors, for actions to which, in the eye of justice, the most ignominious deaths are only due.

I have been frequently induced to think, that the military actions of the Greeks and Romans being rendered more illustrious by the writers of those nations than their legislative institutions, hath, in a great measure, contributed to stamp on the deeds of arms, a superior worth to those of legislation, and particularly in the minds of princes ; but it seems probable, that were it sufficiently reflected upon, how much the genius of a legislator is superior to that of the most consummate general, how much more arduous the task, of planning or perfecting government, is than that of defeating armies, that intellect and virtue can alone be equal
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to the former, and casualty may, and frequently does, give victory to inferior understandings and vicious hearts, Sovereigns might be induced to relinquish the clamorous joy of triumph for the silent and self-approving enjoyment of spreading happiness on millions, and by that means the ambition of writing their renown in blood on half the plains of Europe, may yield to the perpetuation of it by legislative establishments of peace.

Would it not redound more eminently to a sovereign's immortal fame, to have it inscribed on his tomb, Here lies the prince, who first exerted himself in establishing a confederacy, by which all Europe was rendered happy? then to have a sumptuous monument, adorned with trophies and all the military instruments of death, embellished with pompous inscriptions of thousands slain, cities ransacked, kingdoms laid waste, and nations ruined? To whom are mankind most essentially indebted? to Alexander, who dethron'd Darius, took his family captives, burnt his metropolis, and laid his kingdoms waste, or to him who brought the first discovery of the Peruvian bark into Europe? Can that great general, who pushed innumerable enemies to perish in the Danube, be compared with the virtuous Hales, who invented the ventilator, and saved the lives of thousands? or the conquests of Charlemagne, with the virtuous Titus, who grieved to have passed a day unmarked with some act of goodness. Millions unborn, at the hour of these conquests, have since deplored the ruin which were brought upon them by the loss of those fathers who fell in victory; millions to come shall taste the bliss, and bless the discoverers of preserving health and dispelling sickness. The latter resemble the supreme
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parent, and the former the implacable destroyer ; and it must for ever prove an eternal reflection on human kind, that fame, honors and admiration are gained more effectually by imitating the foe of human race, than the infinitely benignant author of all.

Nor will that difficulty attend the accomplishing this project, which may be generally imagined. The interests of nineteen states are more easily reconciled than those of millions, and yet government of some kind or other, all which are evidently productive of happiness, compared with a state of anarchy, is established in every realm of Europe ; and in this general league or association, tho' perfection may never be attained because incompatible with human weakness ; yet improvement must : and men ought to be satisfied to enjoy the increase of happiness to that degree, which human affairs are capable of being carried. The objection of want of perfection, therefore, lies with equal force against all the institutions of human kind, and every thing of that kind should remain untouched, because not to be rendered perfect.

It is by no means necessary that all should at first unite in this design. If the strongest powers associate for the production of this blessing, the weaker must of necessity accede thereto ; for who, amongst them, will presume to offend that united force, which can immediately divest them of their dominions, when they may participate of the advantages of that society, which embraces and secures their interests and possessions.

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This little work was originally the production of the Abbé de St. Pierre, a man, whose studies proceeded from the emotions of a heart, animated with the desire of being universally beneficent; and from his manuscript, J. J. Rousseau has given it to the public. This project was originally delivered to Cardinal Fleury, and the answer which he returned thereto, was, a satire on Princes more justly applicable to Ministers.

“ You have forgotten, Sir, says he, as a preliminary article, to begin by sending a troop of missionaries, to dispose the hearts and intellects of Princes to such a work.”


Nothing is more common amongst ministers, than to despise the attempt of doing good, when it cannot encrease their power; but when it must diminish it, it will certainly then be rejected, tho’ the effects were as evident as a mathematical demonstration.

It is one of the chief concerns of a minister, to keep his sovereign from doing right, and placing his subjects in perpetual tranquility, because his value is raised in proportion as he disentangles his master from those embarrassments, into which he precipitates himself, and from which he is freed by the arts of his prime agency.

Happy the potentate, who shall first endeavour at the execution of this scheme, and at this moment, when many sovereigns are uniting in a congress for the establishment of peace, permit me to indulge the warm sensations
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of my heart, in imagining a prince, whose diadem has not yet surrounded his head, tho' called to empire, to be the foremost in promoting universal happiness and peace; in freeing the subjects of all Europe from cares, imposts, and oppression; in extinguishing the rage of war, and profusion of national treasure; in acquiring immortal fame by acts of virtue, and delivering down, a permanent felicity to a people, who will, therefore, bless him thro' all succeeding generations. By these ways, princes can alone, approach the nature of the immortal gods, and render themselves deservedly immortal.

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 S the human understanding cannot be employed on any project more grand, more sublime and useful, than that of perpetual peace amongst all the nations of Europe, so never did an author more deservedly merit the public attention, than he who proposes to carry that project into execution. It is even difficult for a man of virtue and sensibility not to be seized with enthusiasm on such a subject ; and I know not whether the illusion of a heart truly humane, whose zeal renders every thing easy, is not, in that respect, preferable to that austere

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reason, which is always rejecting, and finds in its own indifference for the public good, the chief obstacle to all that can favour it.

I am under no doubt that the greatest part of my readers will come fore-armed with incredulity, in order to resist the pleasure of persuasion, and I pity such, who mistake a gloomy obstinacy for wisdom. But it is to be hoped, that some soul, touched with the importance of the object, will participate the delicious emotion, with which I enter upon a subject so interesting to humanity. I step forth to behold, at least in idea, mankind uniting in love and friendship; I dispose myself to contemplate, of a sweet and peaceful society of brothers, living in eternal concord, all guided by the same maxims, all happy in one common felicity; and thus by realizing in myself, so striking a picture, the imagery of that happiness which exists not, will, for some moments, impart the taste of its being actually present.

Having in this manner devoted the first lines of this performance to the irresistible sentiment with which I was filled, let me now endeavour to proceed in the path of reason; resolved, as I am, not to advance any thing without proof; I request the reader, in his turn, to deny nothing which he does not refute; for it is not the reasoners which I fear so much as those, who disobedient to arguments, will yet object nothing thereto.

It requires but little reflection upon the means of perfecting any kind of government, in order to perceive that the embarrassment and obstacles thereto, spring less from its constitution, than from foreign relations;
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from whence it results, that the greatest part of those cares which should be consecrated to polity, we are constrained to destine for its preservation, and to apply more diligently to place it in a state of resisting others, than to render it perfect in itself. If the order of society, as it is pretended, was the work of reason, rather than of passion, should we have delayed so long, to discover that hitherto too little or too much hath been done for our happiness; that each individual being in a civil state, respecting his fellow citizens, and in that of nature, respecting the rest of the world; we have not prevented particular wars but to create general ones, which are infinitely more terrible, and that in uniting ourselves to particular men, we become the enemies of human-kind?

If there be a method of extirpating those dangerous contradictions, it is probably to be accomplished by a confederative form of government alone, which combining nations by the same bonds which connect individuals, but equally subjects, both one and the other, to the legislative authority. This kind of government appears, in other respects, preferable to all others, in that it comprehends at the same time, the advantages of great and small states; it is respectable abroad by its power, because the laws are vigorously maintained, and because it is the only one which is adapted equally to restrain the subjects, their governors, and foreign kingdoms.

Though this form should appear new in certain respects, and that it has not been well understood but by the moderns, yet the antients were not totally ignorant

thereof. The Greeks had their Amphictyons, the Etrurians their Lucomeni, the Latins their Ferri, the Gauls their cities, and the last efforts of Greece became still illustrious by the Achean league; but none of these confederacies approach, in the wisdom of their institutions, to that of the Germanic Body, of the Helvetic League, and of the States General; and if these bodies politic are still so few, and so distant from that perfection of which we perceive them susceptible, it is because the most perfect is not so easily carried into execution as is generally imagined; and in policy as in morality, the extent of our faculties scarce proves any thing but the greatness of our misfortunes.

Besides these public confederacies, others less apparent, though not less real, may silently form themselves, by the union of interests, by the analogy of maxims, by the conformity of manners, and by other circumstances which permit the common relations, between divided nations, to subsist. It is in this manner, that all the Potentates of Europe, form amongst themselves a kind of system, which unites them by the same religion, by the same law of nations, by manners, by letters, by commerce, and by every kind of equipoize, which is the necessary result of all those; and which, without any one's studying to preserve, is not so easy to be broken, as many men are inclined to think.

This society of the European nations, hath not always existed, and the particular causes which gave it birth, are still subservient to its preservation. In fact, before the Roman conquests, all the nations of this part of the world, barbarous, unknowing, and unknown of,
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each other, had nothing in common but the human qualities, which being depreciated at that time by slavery, differed but little in their intellects from those of brutes: on this account, the Greeks, philosophical and vain, distinguished, as it were, mankind into two species; one of which, meaning themselves, was destined to command, and the other, which included the rest of the world, to serve alone. From this principle, it resulted, that a Gaul or Spaniard, was of as little consideration in the opinion of a Grecian, as a Negroe on the coast of Guinea, or an Indian in the woods of America; and even the Barbarians themselves, had no more affinity between them, than the Greeks had with either one or the other of those nations.

But when at length this people, sovereign by nature, had been subdued by the Romans their slaves, and a great part of the known hemisphere had submitted to the same yoke, a political and civil union was formed between all the members of the same empire; this union was greatly circumscribed by the maxim, either extremely sage, or extremely insane, of communicating to the vanquished, all the same rights of the victors, and more especially by the famous decree of Claudius, which incorporated all the subjects of Rome into the number of her citizens.

To this political chain, which thus combined all the members into one body, were joined the civil institutions and laws, which imparted new force to those combinations, by determining in a manner equitable, clear and precise, at least as much as it was capable of being done in so vast an empire, the reciprocal rights and duties of
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the sovereign and his subjects, and those of the citizens amongst themselves. The Theodosian code, and after that the books of Justinian, were new links of justice and of reason, aptly substituted to that of sovereign power, which began insensibly to relax. This succedaneum greatly retarded the dissolution of the Empire, and preserved to it, for a long while, a kind of jurisdiction over those very Barbarians, who were then ravaging it.

There was yet a third bond of union, stronger than the preceding, it was that of religion; and it cannot be denied, that to christianity we are most superlatively obliged even to this day, for that species of society which is perpetuated amongst its members; in such sort, that whoever, amongst those members, has not adapted, on that head, the sentiments of the others, still remains like a stranger amongst them. Christianity, so much their contempt at its birth, served at length for an asylum to those who had defamed it: and even after the cruel persecutions which were so ineffectually inflicted thereon by the Romans, even that empire found resources therein, which no longer subsisted in their forces; their missions were more prevalent than their victories, she sent her bishops to repair the transgressions of her generals, and she triumph'd by her priests, when her soldiers were vanquished. It was in this manner the Franks, the Goths, the Burgundians, the Lombards, and a thousand others, recognized the authority of the Empire after they had subdu'd it, and receiv'd in appearance, with the law of the Evangelists, that of the Prince, who first declared to them the glad tidings of salvation.

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So great was the reverence which still awaited that expiring body, that even to its last moment the destroyers thereof honored themselves with its titles, and those became officers of the empire, who had vilified it by their conquest, the greatest kings accepted, and even boasted of patrician honors of the pretorship and consulate; and like the lyon which flatters the man he may devour, those terrible victors rendered homage to that imperial throne, which they had the immediate power of subverting.

In this manner religion and the empire have formed the social link of various nations; which, without possessing any real community of interests, rights or dependance, enjoyed one of maxims and opinion; the influence of which still remained when the principle was destroyed. The antient image of the Roman Empire has continued to form a kind of combination amongst the members which composed it, and Rome possessing dominion in another manner, after the destruction of the Empire, there remained of that double chain a more close society amongst the nations of Europe, where the center of their powers subsisted, than in the other parts of the world, of which the people, too distant for correspondence, have besides no particular subject of re-union.

To this there must be added the particular situation of Europe, its more equal population and fertility, the closer union of its parts, and continual mixture of interests, that consanguinity, commerce, arts and colonies have distributed amongst the Sovereigns. Besides these,
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the number of rivers, and the variety of their courses, which render the communication of all parts easy. The inconstant disposition of the inhabitants, which invites them continually to travel, and to visit each others countries; the invention of printing, and the general taste of letters, which hath created amongst them a community of studies and of knowledge; in fine, the multitude and smallness of the states, which, united to the calls of luxury, and to the diversity of climates, render them mutually necessary to each other. All these causes combined form of Europe, not like Asia and Africa, an ideal collection of people, who have nothing in common but a name; but a real society, which has its religion, manners, customs, and even its laws, from which no nation that composes a part of it, can separate itself without speedily exciting troubles and commotions.

On the other hand, to behold the continual dissensions, depredations, usurpations, revolts, wars and murders, which daily ravage this respectable abode of sages, this brilliant system of arts and sciences; to consider our sublime conversations and our horrible proceedings, so much humanity in our maxims, and such cruelty in our actions, a religion so humane, and an intolerance so sanguinary, a policy so sage in speculation and so obdurate in practice, sovereigns so beneficent, and subjects so miserable, governments so moderate, and wars so cruel, one knows not how to reconcile such strange contrarieties, and this fraternity of European nations seems to be a term of derision only, ironically to express their mutual enmity.

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Notwithstanding this, affairs do no more than follow their natural course; every society without laws or heads, every union formed or supported by hazard, must necessarily degenerate into quarrel and dissention on fresh changes of circumstances; the antient union of the nations of Europe hath complicated their interests and rights in a thousand different fashions; they touch in ~~some~~ many points, that the least motion of some of them sets the whole in agitation; their divisions are so much the more deplorable, as their combinations are intimate; and their frequent quarrels have almost the cruelty of civil wars.

Be it agreed then, that the relative state of the European powers is properly a state of war; and that all the partial treaties amongst some of those potentates, are rather transient truces than real peace; whether it be because those treaties have commonly no other guaranties than the contracting parties, or because the rights of one and the other are therein never radically decided; and that these rights imperfectly determined, or the pretensions which take the place of them amongst sovereigns who acknowledge no superior, will prove the infallible source of new wars, as soon as other conjunctures shall have given new forces to the pretenders.

Besides this, the public rights of Europe being neither established nor authorised by nations in concert, having no general principles, and varying incessantly according to time and place, are full of contradictory rules, which can never be reconciled but by the right

of the strongest arm ; so that reason, without a certain guide, bending always towards self-interest in doubtful things, war would be inevitable, even when the parties would willingly be just. All that can be done, therefore, with the best intentions, is either to decide those kinds of affairs by arms, or to calm them into repose by transient treaties ; these, when ever occasions revive the same quarrels, join themselves to others, which give them a new modification, and all is again embroiled and complicated ; nothing is any longer seen at the bottom of affairs, usurpation passes for right, and want of powers for injustice ; and amongst this continual disorder, every one finds himself insensibly so violently displaced, that if it were possible to remount to the solid and primitive right of all, there would be few sovereigns in Europe who ought not to render up all that they possess.

There is yet another source of war, more concealed indeed, but not less real : it is, that affairs in changing shape change not their nature ; that states in fact hereditary, remain elective in appearance ; that there are parliaments or national estates in monarchies, and hereditary chiefs in republics ; that one potentate, dependant on another, still preserves the semblance of liberty ; that all the subjects, obedient to the same power, are not governed by the same laws ; that the order of succession is different in divers estates of the same sovereign ; in fine, that every government is continually tending to change, without a possibility of hindering its progress. These are the general and particular causes which unite us for our destruction, and induce us to delineate

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lineate the fair picture of social life, with hands eternally stained with human blood.

The causes of evil being once known, the remedy, if any exists, is sufficiently indicated thereby: every man perceives that all society is formed by common interests, and all division takes its rise from those which are opposite to each other; that a thousand fortuitous events are able to change and modify each other, and from the moment that a society exists, a coactive force becomes necessary, which orders and concertes the movements of its members, thereby to communicate to common advantages and reciprocal engagements, that solidity which by themselves they could not acquire.

It would otherwise be a great error to hope that this violent state could ever change by the sole force of nature, and without the succour of art. The system of Europe has obtained precisely that degree of solidity which can support it in one perpetual agitation, without absolutely subverting it; and if our evils cannot augment, they can less terminate, because every grand revolution is henceforth impossible.

In order to give this all necessary evidence, let us begin with a general survey of the present state of Europe, the situation of mountains, of seas and rivers, which serve as boundaries to the nations which inhabit it, seems to have decided the number and grandeur of their states, and it may be said, that the political order of this part of the globe is in certain respects the work of nature.

In fact, let us not imagine this equipoise, so boasted of, hath been established by any one, and that it hath been done with design to preserve it: we perceive that it exists, and those who feel not in themselves sufficient importance to destroy it, cover their particular views under the pretext of sustaining it. But whether we pay attention thereto or not, this equipoise subsists without the interposition of a second person, and wants no foreign effort for its preservation; and when an alteration is made on one side, it immediately re-establishes itself on the other: so that if those princes, who are accused of aspiring to universal monarchy, have really aspired thereto, they have manifested more ambition than genius, for in what manner can they have imaged to themselves that project, without perceiving the ridicule thereof in the first moment? or how could they be unconvinced that there is not a potentate in Europe so superior to the rest, that he could ever become their master? All conquerors, who have been the authors of revolutions, have advanced with unexpected armies, or with foreign troops, and differently trained to war, against nations disarmed, divided, or without discipline. But where shall we find a European prince with forces which others are not acquainted with, to overwhelm all the others, so long as the most powerful amongst them forms so inconsiderable a part of the whole, and all are so vigilant in observing one another's actions? will he alone have more troops than all the others? it cannot be; and if it could, he would be but the sooner ruined, or his armies would be less formidable in proportion to the greatness of the number. Would he have soldiers more perfectly trained to war? on the contrary,
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he would have them less so in proportion. Besides which, discipline is almost every where the same, or will become so in a short time. Will he have greater treasure? the sources of that are common; and money has never made extensive conquests. Will he make a sudden invasion? famine or fortresses will retard his progress at every step. Will he encrease his dominions insensibly? he thereby affords his enemies the means of uniting to resist him, and even time, money and men will quickly be found wanting. Will he divide the other powers of Europe to overcome them singly? the maxims of Europe will render that policy ineffectual; and the most imbecile sovereign will not be caught in that snare. In fine, not one amongst them being able to possess resources which the others cannot acquire, resistance at length becomes equal to the effort, and time soon re-establishes the rapid accidents of fortune, if not for each particular prince, at least for the general system.

Let us suppose an agreement between two or three potentates to subdue all the rest? These three powers, whoever they may be, will not constitute one half of Europe. The other part then will certainly unite themselves against them: they will therefore have an enemy to oppose, more potent than themselves. To this may be added, that their designs are too contradictory, and their jealousy of each other too great, even to permit them to form such a project in concert: nay, should it be even formed and carried into execution with success, that success would prove the cause of discord amongst those conquerors in alliance, because it would be impossible that their conquests should be so equally divided,

divided, that each should be satisfied with his acquisition; wherefore the discontented would soon oppose the progress of the rest, who, for similar reasons, would soon be divided amongst themselves. I am in doubt whether, since the existence of this world, it has been ever seen, that three, nay, even two grand potentates, have cordially united to subdue the rest, without quarrelling on contingents or participation of conquest, and without soon affording, by their misunderstanding, new resources to the weak. Thus, in every supposition which can be formed, there seems no probability, that either one prince, or an union of princes can, for the future, considerably change the state of things amongst us, in a manner that it may continue permanent.

It is not sufficient to say, that the Alps, the Rhine, the sea, the Pyrenean mountains, are obstacles insurmountable to ambition; but these obstacles are supported by others, which give them strength, or bring back the states to the same limits, when they have been removed by transient effects. That which constitutes the true support of the system of Europe, is in great part the tricks in negotiations, which almost always mutually ballance each other; but that system has yet a more solid support, and this is the Germanic body, placed almost in the center of Europe, which holds the other parts in respect, and serves perhaps more effectually to sustain its neighbours than its own members. This body, tho' formidable to strangers, by its extent, number and riches of its people, is still useful to all, by its constitution, which removing the means and inclination of making conquests, proves the rock against which the conquerors are ship-wrecked. In spite of all
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the imperfections of this constitution of the empire, it is certain, that as long as it shall subsist, the ballance of Europe will never be destroyed; that no Potentate will have reason to apprehend his being dethroned by another, and that the treaty of Westphalia will for ever be amongst us the basis of our political system. Thus the law of nations, which the Germans study with such application, is of more importance than is generally imagined, and is not only the law of the Germans, but, in certain respects, that of all Europe.

But if the present system is immoveable, it is for that reason the more tempestuous; for there is between the powers of Europe, a continual action and re-action, which, without absolutely displacing, keeps them in perpetual agitation, and their efforts are always ineffectual and always generating, like the waves of the sea, which incessantly agitate the surface without ever changing the level; so that the subjects are continually harrassed without any perceptible advantage to their sovereigns.

It would not be difficult to deduce the same truth from the particular interests of all the courts of Europe; because I could make it easily visible, that these interests interfere in a manner to restrain all their forces in mutual respect; but the ideas of commerce and of riches having generated a species of political fanaticism, they produce so sudden a change in the apparent interests of all princes, that no stable maxim can be established upon the true, because all depends at present on oeconomical principles, the greatest part extremely whimsical, which pass thro' the heads of ministers. However it may be, commerce, which daily tends to pre-serve

serve itself in equipoise, taking from certain powers the exclusive advantages which they derived therefrom, at the same time deprives them of the great means which they possessed of giving laws to others *.

If I have insisted upon the equal distribution of force, which results from the actual constitution of Europe, it is with a view to deduce from them a consequence of great importance to the establishing a general association; for to form a solid and durable confederacy, it is necessary that the members should be placed in mutual dependance, in such sort, that no one singly be in a condition to resist all the rest, and that the particular associations which even offend the grand one, be opposed by obstacles sufficient to hinder their execution, without which the confederacy would be fruitless, and each be really independant under an apparent subjection. If these obstacles then are such as I have above related at present, when all Potentates have an entire liberty of forming amongst themselves offensive leagues and treaties, one may judge from this what they would be

* Things have changed since I wrote the above, but my principle will remain nevertheless always true; for example, it is easy to foresee that in twenty years from this time, England, with all its glory, will be ruined, and have lost the remainder of its liberty. All the world affirms, that agriculture flourishes in that island; and I will venture to lay a wager, that it declines. London encreases every day; the kingdom then decreases in number of inhabitants: the English resolve to be conquerors, for which reason they will not even retard the day of slavery.

be when one great armed league should be made, always in readiness to prevent those who would undertake to destroy or oppose it. This suffices to shew that such an association would not consist of fruitless deliberations, which each might resist with impunity; but that there would be generated therefrom an effective power, capable of containing the ambitious within the bounds of the general treaty.

From this exposition of things, three truths incontestably result. The first, the Turk excepted, that there reigns amongst all the nations of Europe an imperfect social connexion, yet still more close than the general and loose ties of humanity. The second, that the imperfection of this society renders the condition of those who compose it, even worse than the privation of all society among them. The third, that these first ties, which render this society hurtful, render it at the same time easy to be brought to perfection in such sort, that all the members might derive their happiness from the actual cause of their misery, and transform, into an eternal peace, that state of war which reigns amongst them.

Let us now consider in what manner this great work, begun by fortune, may be accomplished by reason, and how that free and voluntary society which unites all the European states, assuming force and solidity from a body truly political, may be changed into a real confederacy. It is not to be doubted, that such an establishment imparting to that association the perfection which it stands in need of, would destroy the abuse, extend the advantages, and force all the parties to concur in

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the common good ; but to effectuate this, it is necessary that this confederacy be so general, that no considerable power refuses to become a member thereof ; that a judicial tribunal be erected therein, endued with authority to institute those laws and regulations, which all the parties are to obey. That it possess a coercive and coercive force to compel each state to submit to the common deliberations, whether active or restrictive ; in fine, that it be durable and firm, to prevent the members from detaching themselves therefrom at their inclination, as soon as they shall perceive their particular interests to be contradictory to the general ; these are the certain signs by which it may be known that the institution is sage, useful and immoveable : it remains now to extend this supposition, in order to discover by analysis what ought to be the effects which should result therefrom, what means are proper to establish it, and what reasonable hope may be entertained of carrying it into execution.

There are formed amongst us, from time to time, a certain kind of general diets, under the appellation of congresses, where ambassadors from all the states of Europe solemnly repair to return as they sat out. In these assemblies they either meet to say nothing ; to treat of public affairs as they do private ; or to deliberate in common, whether the table shall be round or square, how many doors the room shall have in which they meet. If such a plenipotentiary shall sit with his face or his back towards the window ; if one shall be advanced two inches of space more or less than another in a visit, and upon a thousand questions of equal import, uselessly agitated for the

the three last ages, and certainly very worthy of employing the politicians of the present.

It is not impossible but that the members of one of these assemblies may be once endowed with common sense; it is not impossible also, but that they may be sincerely disposed to pursue the public good; and by the reasons which will be hereafter deduced, it is to be conceived, that after having smoothed many difficulties, they may receive orders from their respective sovereigns to sign the general confederacy, which I suppose to be summarily contained in the five following articles.

By the first, the contracting powers shall establish among themselves a perpetual and irrevocable alliance, and shall name the plenipotentiaries to hold a permanent congress in a place appointed, in which all the differences of the contracting parties shall be regulated or determined by arbitration or judgment.

By the second, the number of sovereigns shall be specified, whose plenipotentiaries shall have votes at this congress, those who shall be incited to accede to the treaty; the order, time, and manner in which the presidentship shall pass from one to the other by equal intervals; in fine, the respective quota of contributions, and the manner of raising them for the common expence.

By the third, the confederacy shall guaranty to each of its members the possession and government of all the states which they actually possess, as well as the elective or hereditary succession, according as the whole is established by the fundamental laws of each

country, and suddenly to suppress the source of those contests which are incessantly generating amongst them. It shall be agreed between them to take the actual possession, and the last treaties, for the basis of all the mutual rights of the contracting powers; renouncing for ever and reciprocally to all anterior pretensions, except the future successions, capable of contention, and other rights which may expire, which shall be regulated at the arbitration of the congress, without its being ever permitted, to do themselves justice by action, or to take arms against each other, under any pretext whatsoever.

By the fourth, it shall be specified that every ally, who shall infract this treaty, shall be put to the ban of Europe, and proscribed as a common enemy; that is, if he refuses to comply with the judgments of the grand alliance, if he prepares for war, if he negotiates treaties repugnant to the confederacy, if he takes arms to resist or attack any of the allies. It shall be stipulated also by the same article, that each shall arm and act offensively, conjointly, and at the common expence, against every state who shall be put to the ban of Europe, until the offender hath laid down his arms, executed the judgment and ordinances of the congress, repaired all wrongs, reimbursed all expences, and done justice for the preparations of war contrary to treaty.

And lastly, by the fifth, the plenipotentiaries of this European body shall always have power to frame in the congress, according to a majority of voices for the presentation, and according to three fourths thereof, for the decision, five years after, upon the instructions from
their

PERPETUAL PEACE. 21

their courts, those regulations which they shall judge of import for procuring to the European republic, and to every one of its members, all possible advantages; but it shall never be permitted to change any part of those five fundamental articles, but with the unanimous consent of the confederates.

These five articles, thus abridged, and included in general rules, are, I know, subject to a thousand little difficulties, many of which will require long explanations; but small difficulties easily give way to necessity, and such are of no concern in an enterprize important as this is. When the detail of the police of this congress shall come in question, a thousand obstacles will present themselves, and ten thousand means of extirpating them. The question at present is to examine by the nature of the thing, if the undertaking be or be not possible. A man would lose himself in volumes of inanity, if all is to be foreseen and answered. In adhering to principles incontestable, it should not be proposed to satisfy every intellect, nor to resolve every objection, nor to say in what manner every thing shall be done; it is sufficient to shew, that all is capable of being accomplished.

What then remains necessary to be examined to form a judgment of this system? Two questions only; for it is an insult which I would by no means offer to the reader, to prove that in general peace is preferable to war.

The first question is, if the confederacy proposed will

will certainly attain its end, and prove sufficient for the solid and perpetual peace of Europe.

The second is, if it be the interest of the respective sovereigns to establish this confederacy, and purchase a constant peace at this price.

When the general and particular interest shall be thus demonstrated, there appears no cause, in the reason of things, which can prevent the effect of an establishment, that depends solely on the inclination of those who are interested therein.

In order to discuss the first article, let us apply that which has been already said on the general system of Europe, and of the common effort which circumscribes every potentate almost within his own boundaries, and does not permit him entirely to crush the others.

Wherefore to render my reasonings more intelligible in that point, I shall subjoin the list of nineteen potentates, which may be supposed to compose the European republic, so that each having an equal vote, there will be nineteen in the congress.

The Emperor of the Romans.

The Emperor of Russia.

The King of France.

The King of Spain.

The King of England.

The States General.

The King of Denmark.

Sweden.

Poland.

Poland.

The King of Portugal.

The Sovereign of Rome.

The King of Prussia.

The Elector of Bavaria, and his associates.

The Elector Palatine, and his associates.

The Swiss, and their associates.

The Ecclesiastical Electors, and their associates.

The Republic of Venice, and her associates.

The King of Naples.

The King of Sardinia.

Several sovereigns of less consideration, such as the republic of Genoa, the dukes of Modena and Parma, and other states omitted in this list, shall be joined to the least powerful, in form of association, and shall enjoy with them a right of voting, resembling the *votum curiatum* of the counts of the empire. It is useless, in this place, to give a more exact enumeration, because even to the moment of carrying this project into execution, accidents may every moment supervene, which render it necessary to be reformed, but which alter nothing respecting the foundation of the system.

It requires nothing more than to cast our eyes on the above list, to perceive with the clearest conviction, that it is not possible that either of these powers which compose it, can be in a condition to resist all the others, united in one body; or that any partial league formed therefrom, can be capable to make head against the grand alliance.

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For in what manner would that league be composed ? Would it be amongst the most powerful of the Princes ? We have shewn that it cannot be durable, and it is easy to see at present, that it is incompatible with the general system of each great potentate, and with those interests which are inseparable from their constitution. Would it be then between one great and several small states ? The other grand powers united in one confederacy, would soon crush that league : and we ought to think, that the grand alliance being always united and armed, it would be easy for it, in virtue of the fourth article, to prevent and suppress instantly, all partial and seditious alliances, which tend to disturb the peace and public order.

Consider that which passes in the Germanic body, in spite of the abuse of its police, and the extreme inequality of its members ; is there even one amongst the most puissant, who dares to expose himself to the ban of the empire, by openly offending against the constitution thereof ; at least, unless he believes he has good reason not to fear that the Empire will act in earnest against him. Hence, I hold it to be demonstrated, that the European congress once established, there will be no longer cause to be apprehensive of rebellions ; and tho' some abuses may insinuate themselves therein, that they never can proceed so far as to elude the object of this institution ; it remains now to see, whether that object will be well answered by the institution.

With this view, let us consider the motives which induce princes to take arms : those are, either to make conquests, to protect themselves from invaders, to render a
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dissention ineffectual, which cannot be amicably concluded, or lastly, to fulfil the engagements of a treaty. There is neither cause nor pretext for war, which cannot be ranged under one or other of these heads; it is evident then, that neither of these can exist in this new state of things. First, all future designs of conquest must be renounced by the impossibility of making any, because, who ever attempts it, is sure to be stopt in his career by greater forces than he can raise; hence, in risking to lose all, he is incapacitated from gaining any thing. An ambitious Prince, who is resolved to aggrandize himself in Europe, effects two things; he begins by fortifying himself by good alliances, afterwards he endeavours to take his enemy unprovided: but particular alliances will avail nothing, against another which is stronger and always subsisting, and no prince having any longer a pretext for taking arms, he cannot accomplish it without being perceived, prevented, and punished by the confederacy, which is always in arms.

The same reason which deprives every prince of the hopes of conquest, takes from him, at the same time, the dread of being attacked; and not only his dominions guarantied by all Europe, are as secure to him, as the possessions of the subjects are in a well governed kingdom, but even more than if he was their only and proper protector, in the same proportion, that all Europe is more potent than he alone.

There no longer subsists any inclination to reduce a neighbour, from whom there is nothing to fear: and there is even no temptation when there are no hopes of success.

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With respect to the support of those laws, it ought first to be remarked, that an infinity of chicanery, of obscure and confused pretensions, will be annihilated by the third article of the confederacy, which definitively regulates all the reciprocal rights of the allied Sovereigns over their actual possessions. By these means, all possible demands and pretensions will be rendered clear for the future, and will be decided in the congress, in proportion as they shall arise : add to this, that if any one attacks my rights, I ought to sustain them by the same way ; now, no one can attack them by arms without incurring the ban of the congress. It is no longer, therefore, necessary that they are to be defended by arms ; and the same ought to be said of injuries, wrongs, and reparations ; and of all the unforeseen disputes which can arise between two sovereigns ; and the same power which defends their rights, ought also to redress their grievances.

As to the last article, the solution of it is too obvious to be unperceived, it is visible at first sight ; that there being no longer any aggressor to be dreaded, there remains no necessity for defensive treaties ; and as it is impossible to make any more solid, or more sure, than the grand confederacy, all other would be useless, illegal, and of no effect.

It is not possible, therefore, that the confederacy being once established, that any seeds of hostility can remain amongst the confederates, and that the object of perpetual peace, be not exactly accomplished by the execution of the system proposed.

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It now remains, that we examine the other question, which respects the advantage of the contracting parties; for it is easily discerned, that the public interest must speak in vain to the prejudice of the private. To prove that peace is in general preferable to war, is offering nothing to him, who believes that he has reason to prefer war to peace; and to shew him the means of establishing a durable peace, is but to excite him to oppose it.

In fact, it will be said, that sovereigns are no longer permitted the right of doing themselves justice, or of doing injustice whenever it shall please them: the power of aggrandizing themselves will be taken away, and they must renounce all that pomp of power and dread, with which they love to terrify the world, and that glory of conquests from which they derive their honour; in fine, they will be compelled to be equitable and pacific. What will be the indemnification for being deprived of all these?

To this, I dare not answer with the Abbé de St. Pierre; that the true glory of Princes, consists in procuring utility to the public, and happiness to their subjects; that all their interests are subordinate to their reputation, and that the reputation which is acquired amongst men of wisdom, is measured by the good which is done to human kind; that the attempt towards a perpetual peace, being the greatest which hath ever been undertaken, is the most capable of bestowing immortal glory on the author; that this undertaking, being in like manner, the most useful to their subjects, is also the most

honourable for their sovereigns; and above all, the only one which cannot be sullied with blood, rapine, tears, and malediction; and lastly, the most inevitable means of being distinguished amongst the mob of Kings, is that of labouring for the public happiness. This discourse, in the cabinet of ministers, hath covered with ridicule, the author and his projects: but let us not, like them, despise the reasons which it contains; and, however it may be, respecting the virtues of princes, let us speak of their interests.

All the potentates of Europe, have either real or pretended claims, on one the other; these are by nature incapable of being perfectly explained, because there is no common and invariable rule, by which they can be judged, and because they are often founded on equivocal or uncertain facts: the differences which they cause, cannot be so decided as never to return, as well through want of competent arbitrators, as because every Prince recurs without scruple, when occasion offers, to those cessions, which have been wrested from him by force in treaties, by the more powerful; or, after the conclusion of unsuccessful wars. It is a mistake, then, to think of our pretensions upon others, and to forget those of others upon us, when there is on neither side, either more justice or more advantage, in the means of imparting success to those reciprocal pretensions. As soon as all depends on fortune, actual possession is of a price, that wisdom will permit no man to risque, against an advantage that may only amuse, even on an equal chance; and all mankind agree in blaming a person at his ease, who, in hopes of doubling his possessions, presumes to risque it on one cast of the dice. But we have made it apparent, that

that in projects of aggrandisement, each in the actual system, ought to meet resistance superior to his efforts; from whence it follows, that the strongest having no reason to play, nor the weakest any hope of winning, it becomes the advantage of all, to renounce what they desire, in order to secure what they possess.

Let us consider the destruction of men, the waste of money, of powers in every kind, and in what manner every state is exhausted by the most auspicious war; let us compare the injuries, with the advantages which are derived therefrom, and we shall find, that he becomes frequently a loser, who believes he has gained, and that the conqueror, always less powerful than before the commencement of hostilities, has no other consolation, than to see the vanquished more exhausted than himself; besides this, even that advantage is less real than apparent, because the superiority which may have been acquired over his antagonist, hath, during that time, been lost over neutral powers; which, without changing their condition, fortify themselves, with respect to us, with all our weakness.

If all kings are not yet recovered from the madness of conquests, it seems, at least, as if the wisest amongst them, begin to discern that they cost more than they are worth. Without entering on that head, into a thousand distinctions which would lead us too far out of the way; it may be said, in general, that a prince, who extends his frontiers, and loses as many of his old subjects as he acquires new, becomes weaker by his aggrandizing himself; because, with more dominions to defend, he has no more defenders: besides this, no one can be ignorant that

that in the manner in which war is carried on at present, the least depopulation which it causes, is that which is produced amongst the soldiery; it is in that, indeed, that the loss is most apparently felt, but it produces, at the same time, thro' all the state, a more melancholy and irreparable loss, than that of those who die, by the want of those who would otherwise have been born, by the increase of taxes, by the interruption of commerce, by unpeopling the country and abandoning agriculture; thus the evil, which is scarce perceptible at first, makes itself cruelly felt in the consequence, and it is then we are astonished at the imbecillity of having endeavoured to render ourselves so powerful.

That which renders conquest even still less interesting, is, that at present the means are known by which power may be doubled or tripled, not only without extending territories, but even sometimes by contracting them, as was wisely done by the Emperor Adrian. It is now known, that the number of inhabitants constitutes the power of princes, and that it is a proposition consequent of what I have been advancing, that of two states which support the same number of inhabitants, that which occupies the least extent of territory, is really the most potent. It is then by good laws, by a well understood police, by great views of oeconomy, that a prudent sovereign is sure of augmenting his forces, without trusting any thing to hazard: the only true conquests which he makes on his neighbours, are the more useful establishments which he institutes in his own realms, and all the encreasing subjects which are born to him, are so many enemies which he destroys.

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It ought not to be objected to me in this place, that I prove too much, in as much as if things were as I represent them; each prince having a real interest in abstaining from hostilities and particular interests, uniting themselves with the general, in support of peace; that peace ought to establish itself and continue always without a confederacy. That would be to reason erroneously in the present constitution of things; for tho' it would prove much more advantageous for all parties to be constantly in peace, the common want of security in that respect, has this effect, that each being uncertain of avoiding war, endeavours, at least, to begin it to his advantage, when occasion favours him; and to prevent his neighbour, who would not fail to prevent him in his turn, on a contrary opportunity; from whence it happens, that many wars, even offensive ones, proceed from the unjust precautions of placing one's proper possessions in safety, rather than from the means of usurping those of others. However salutary these maxims for the public good may be in general, it is certain, that in considering the object which policy alone regards, and often, even morality itself, they become pernicious to him who resolves to carry them into practice with all the world, when no one practises the same with him.

I have nothing to say on the parade of armies, because destitute of solid foundations, be it of hope or of fear; that parade is no more than a play of children, and kings ought not to have puppets. Nor shall I say any thing concerning the glory of conquerors, because if there be certain monsters, who would find themselves in deep affliction, only because there remained no more
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whom they could massacre, one ought not to reason with them, but divest them of the means of exercising their blood-thirsty rage. The guaranty of the third article having prevented all solid reason for making war, there can be no motive for any potentate's declaring it against others, which others will not equally possess for beginning hostilities against him; and it is no small advantage to be freed from that risque, where one alone opposes all.

With respect to that dependance on the common tribunal, in which each will be placed, it is evident, that it will diminish nothing of the rights of the sovereignty; but on the contrary, confirm and render them more certain by the third article, in guarantying to each power, not only his states against all foreign invasions, but also his authority against all rebellion from his own subjects. Thus princes will not be less absolute by this confederacy, and their crowns will be more immoveable, in submitting themselves to the judgment of their congress; in their contests between equals, and in divesting themselves of the dangerous power of seizing the property of others, they do nothing more than secure to themselves their true rights, and renounce those which they have not. Besides this, there is great difference between depending on others, and on a body, of which each party is always a member, and the head thereof in rotation; for in this last instance, his liberty is ascertained by the guaranties which are given him, and that which would be alienated, if deposited in the hands of one master, becomes strengthened in those of associates.

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This observation is confirmed by the example of the Germanic body; for tho' the sovereignty of the members be changed in many respects by its constitution, and they may be, of consequence, in a less favorable situation than those of the European body would be, there is nevertheless not one amongst them, jealous as he may be of his authority, who would; were it in his power, render his independance absolute, by detaching himself from the empire; it is to be remarked also, that the Germanic body, having one permanent head, his authority is continually tending towards usurpation; a circumstance which could never happen in the European congress, where the presidentship would be alternate, and without respect to the inequality of the potentates.

To these considerations there is added another yet more important; for those who are so greedy of treasure as princes always are, it is the great facility of possessing an immense quantity, by all the advantages of this continual peace, which result to their subjects and themselves, by the excessive expence which will be saved by the diminution of every thing relative to war, by the discontinuing those multitudes of fortresses, and that enormous quantity of troops which devour their revenues, and every day become more onerous to their subjects and themselves. I am convinced that it is not convenient for all the sovereigns to disband their forces, and to have no public army in readiness to suppress unexpected commotions, and repel sudden invasion. I am conscious also, that the confederacy will be obliged to furnish their contingents, as well for the guarding the frontiers of Europe, as for the support of the confederate

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army, destined to sustain the decrees of the congress, whenever there shall be occasion for it. Yet when all these expences are made, and the extraordinary ones, which are spent in war, suppressed, there will still remain more than one half of the common military charges, which will alleviate the grievances of the subject, and fill the sovereign's coffers; so that the people would pay less taxes, and the prince, much enriched, would be in a condition to encourage commerce, agriculture, arts, to make useful establishments that would still encrease his and his peoples riches; besides which, the state with all this, would be placed in a much more perfect security, than that which could be derived from armies, and all that pomp of war, which is continually exhausting it in the most profound tranquility.

It may be said, that the frontier states of Europe would be in the most disadvantageous situation, and might still equally have their wars to maintain against the Turks, the pyrates of Africa, or the Tartars. To this I answer First, That those countries are in the same circumstances at present, therefore it would be for them no positive disadvantage, but only an advantage less than the others would receive, and an inevitable inconveniency to which their situation exposes them. Secondly, that by being delivered from all anxiety on the part of Europe, they would be much better enabled to resist their other enemies. Thirdly, that the demolition of all those fortresses in the interior parts of Europe, and the saving those expences which are necessary for their support, would place the confederacy in condition to establish a great number on the frontiers,

frontiers, without expence to the confederacy. Fourthly, that these fortresses built, supported, and garrisoned at the common charge, would prove so many securities and means of saving for the frontier potentates, whose states they would guard. Fifthly, that the troops of the confederacy distributed on the confines of Europe, would be always in readiness to repel an invader. And, sixthly, a body so formidable as the European republic, would eradicate from foreign powers the inclination of attacking any of its members, as the Germanic body, infinitely less powerful, is still sufficiently strong to procure respect from its neighbours, and usefully to protect all the princes which compose it.

It may be said, that the Europeans having no longer any wars amongst them, the military art would insensibly fall into oblivion; that the troops would lose their courage and their discipline; that there would no longer exist either generals or soldiers; and that Europe would stand at the mercy of the first invader. To this I answer, that one of these two things would be the consequence thereof, either the neighbours of Europe would make war against it, or revereing the confederacy, would leave it in peace.

In the first instance, there would still remain opportunities of cultivating a military genius, of training and forming troops: the armies of the confederacy would be in that respect the school of Europe, and men would repair to the frontiers to learn the art of war. In the bosom of Europe peace would reign, and by these means the advantages of both would be united. Is it to be imagined that it is always necessary to be combating one another to become

warriors? are the French less brave because the provinces of Anjou and Tourain are no longer in war with each other?

In the second instance, it must be confessed, there would no longer remain an opportunity of learning the military art, but then there would no longer remain any necessity for it; for to what purpose would it be to be exercised in arms, when there would be no enemy to be attacked? Which is to be preferred, the cultivation of a sanguinary art, or the rendering it useless? Was there a secret existing by which to enjoy continual health, would it not be folly to reject it, lest physicians should lose the means of acquiring experience? it remains how to see by comparison which of the two arts is in itself most salutary, and most deserving to be preserved.

Let it be supposed that some sudden invasion arrives without a previous declaration of war; all the world knows that Europe has nothing of that kind to fear, and that this invader will never come. Those irruptions of Barbarians, which seemed to fall from the clouds, are no longer existing. For ever since the whole surface of the earth may be examined with a curious eye, there can nothing approach us which may not be seen at a great distance. There is no potentate on earth who is in a condition to menace all Europe; and if such a one should ever arrive, either we shall have time to prepare ourselves, or we shall be in a situation more proper for resisting when united in one body, than when all differences are to be concluded in haste, in order to our union.

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In this manner it is visible, that all the pretended inconveniences of the confederacy, being well weighed, are reduced to air. We shall now presume to ask, if any man on earth will have the hardiness to say so much of those which result from the actual manner of deciding differences between princes by the right of the longest sword; that is to say, from that state of disorder and war, which necessarily engenders the absolute and mutual independance of all the sovereigns in that imperfect society which reigns in Europe. In order therefore the better to examine those inconveniences, I am going to make a summary account of what has been said, which I leave to the reader's examination.

1. There is no certain right but that of the strongest.
2. Continual and inevitable changes proceeding from the relation between nations, which prevent any of them from the power of fixing in their own hands that force which they enjoy.
3. No perfect security whilst your neighbours continue unsubdued or unannihilated.
4. The general impossibility of annihilating them, provided that in subduing the former others arise.
5. Precautions and immense expences to be always upon the guard.
6. The deficiency of forces and of defence in minorities and revolts; for when the state is in participation, who can support one against the other.
7. Defect of security in mutual engagements.
8. Justice is never to be expected from others without immense expence and losses, which do not always obtain it, and of which the object in dispute but rarely proves an indemnification.
9. The inevitable risque of their dominions, and sometimes of their lives in pursuit of their rights.
10. The necessity
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of taking part in the quarrels of our neighbours in spite of ourselves, and to be engaged in war when we have the least inclination for it. 11. The interruption of commerce and public resources at the moment in which they are most necessary. 12. The continual danger of a powerful enemy if we are weak, and of a league, if strong. 13. The uselessness of wisdom where fortune presides, where the perpetual desolation of the subjects, the reduction of the national strength both in success and its reverse, the total impossibility of establishing a good government, of reckoning any thing our own, and of rendering either ourselves or others happy.

Let us now recapitulate in like manner the advantages of an European arbitration for the confederated princes.

1. Absolute surety that their present and future differences will be constantly terminated without war, a surety incomparably more useful for them, than that of never being engaged in law would be to individuals.

2. The subjects of contest, removed, or reduced to insignificance by the extirpation of all former pretensions, which will amply compensate for what they renounce, and secure what they possess.

3. Perfect and perpetual security of the person, family and dominions of the sovereign, and of the order of succession, fixed by the laws of each country, as well against the ambition of unjust pretenders, as against the revolts of rebel subjects.

4. Perfect surety of the execution of all reciprocal engagements

gagements between prince and prince, by the guaranty of the European republic.

5. Perfect and perpetual liberty and security, respecting commerce, as well from state to state, as in distant regions.

6. Total and perpetual suppression of the extraordinary military expence by sea and land, in times of war, and a considerable diminution of their ordinary expences in times of peace.

7. The visible increase of agriculture and of inhabitants, of riches of the state and of the sovereign.

8. The facility of all establishments which encrease the glory and authority of the sovereign, the public resources and happiness of the people.

Here I leave to the judgment of my readers the examination of all these articles, and the comparison of the state of peace, which results from this confederacy, with the state of war, which results from the want of police in the dominions of Europe.

If here we have rightly reasoned in the exposition of this project, it is proved; First. That the establishment of perpetual peace solely depends on the consent of sovereigns, and has no other difficulty to remove but their opposition. Secondly. That this establishment would be useful in all respects, and that there is no comparison, even for them between its inconveniencies and advantages. Thirdly. That it is reasonable to suppose that
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their inclination will coincide with their interests. Lastly, That this establishment, once formed on the plan proposed, would be solid and durable, and perfectly correspond with its object. Without doubt, it cannot be said that sovereigns will adopt this project, (who can answer for the reason of others,) but only that they would espouse it, if they knew their true interests; for it should be remarked, that we have not herein imagined, that men are such as they ought to be, good, generous, disinterested, lovers of the public good thro' the influence of humanity, but such as they are unjust, avaritious, and preferring their private interest to that of the whole. The only thing supposed is, that they have sense sufficient to discern what is useful, and courage enough to constitute their own happiness. If, in spite of all this, this project remains unexecuted, it is not because it is chimerical, it is that men are mad, and that it is a species of madness to be wise amongst lunatics.



F I N I S.

